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Why Was There Mandatory Retirement?
or the Impossiblity of Efficient Bonding Contracts
ABSTRACT
Lazear has argued that hours constraints, in general, and mandatory
retirement, in particular, form part of an efficient labor market contract
designed to increase output by inhibiting worker shirking. Since the
contract is efficient, legislative interference is welfare reducing.
However, in any case where bonding is costly, the hours constraints will not
be chosen optimally. Although it is theoretically possible that bonding is
costless, in this case the earnings profile is indeterminate and we should
never observe monitoring aimed at reducing shirking. It therefore appears
that bonding should be modelled as costly. If so, the role of policy
depends on the source of bonding costs, the set of feasible contracts and





(714) 856-6205Lazear (1979, 1981) has argued that hours constraints, in general, and
mandatory retirement, in particular, form part of an efficient labor market
contract designed to increase output by inhibiting worker shirking. In
effect, workers post bonds (perhaps in the form of low initial wages)
against malfeasance which are returned to them in the form of higher wages
later in the work relation. Workers who are caught shirking are fired and
forfeit the bond. Since wages deviate from the value of marginal product,
the contract must specify hours as well as wages. If Lazear is correct,
since the contract is efficient, legislative interference is welfare
reducing. Yet, Congress has recently passed a law making mandatory
retirement illegal in most cases.
The Lazear agency model has received considerable attention in the
literature for two reasons. First, there is some evidence that wages rise
faster than productivity (Medoff and Abraham, 1980), and the Lazear agency
model offers an explanation for this finding. Secondly, unlike the shirking
based efficiency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Rulow and Summers,
1986), the contracts discussed by Lazear are first-best efficient.
Researchers who are sceptical about the efficiency wage literature
(Carmichael, 1985, 1986) have pointed to the efficiency of the Lazear
solution as evidence against the efficiency wage model. Proponents of the
efficiency wage model (Akerlof and Katz, 1986) have regarded the possibility
of such contracts as a serious challenge.
The major point of this paper is that in any case where bonding is
costly, bonding contracts will not be first best efficient. In particular,
the hours constraints will not be chosen optimally. Although it is
theoretically possible that bonding is costless, the case of costless
bonding is not particularly interesting since the earnings profile is2
indeterminate, and it is no longer possible to make a strong case that wages
rise faster than productivity. As a consequence the bonding/efficiency
wage debate appears less significant than its participants appear to
believe.
The basic argument is quite simple. If the labor market clears, as it
will in a bonding model, a firm which raises the work requirement by an hour
must increase compensation by the monetized marginal disutility of an hour's
employment. With reasonable restrictions on the relation between disutility
of effort on the job and probability of being caught on the one hand, and
hours of employment, on the other, it can be shown that it will also have to
increase the size of the "bond" that workers are required to post. Since,
as argued below, bonding is costly, the cost to the firm of increasing work
by an hour exceeds the marginal disutility of an hour's employment to the
worker. Consequently, firms will set hours at a level at which the value of
marginal product exceeds the marginal disutility to the worker, and
contracts will not be first-best efficient.
To complete the sketch of the proof, we need merely establish that
bonding is costly. There are two reasons for believing that bonding is
costly. The first is theoretical: as Lazear, himself, notes, the wage
profile is indeterminate unless bonding is costly. Thus unless bonding is
costly, the bonding model has little or no predictive power. The second
reason is empirical: Dickens, Katz and Lang (1986) point out that unless
bonding is costly at the margin, firms will rot engage in any monitoring but
instead will deter shirking solely by setting large bonds. Since we observe
that firms do engage in monitoring, bonding must be costly at the margin.3
It should be noted that the term "costly" is used quite generally.
Bonding may be costly for a number of reasons including but not limited to
the need to pay outside agents to monitor the contract, differences in
discount rates between workers and firms and the potential for firm default.
I show below that, at least for some sources of costly bonding, hours
will be set below their optimal level and that mandatory retirement will
occur too early. This is consistent with work by Kahn and Lang (1986) and
Dickens and Lundberg (1985) which shows that workers wages frequently exceed
their marginal value of leisure. The role of policy depends on the source
of bonding costs, the set of feasible contracts and the policy options which
are available to government.
I. The Basic Model
Let us begin by considering a simple two-period model. In the first
period, the worker is employed and receives a wage. Second period payment.
is conditional on not shirking in the first period. Since second period
compensation cannot be made conditional on not shirking, all workers will
shirk in the second period. Consequently, the second period takes the form
of a pension, P. Assume that the size of the pension (appropriately
discounted) which is returned to the worker if he does not shirk depends on
the size of the initial bond but that the increase is less than one for one.
Under these circumstances, the no shirk condition is given by
(1) w -e(h)+P(b)￿ w +(l-q(h))P(b)
or
(2) P(b) ￿ e(h)/q(h)4
where w is the wage, e is the disutility of effort on the job (value of
shirking), h is the number of hours worked, b is. the bond and q is the
probability of shirking being detected,' and 0P' <1.It seems
reasonable to assume that e'>O and that e' '￿O, that is that the marginal
disutility of effort on the job is always positive and that it is
nondecreasing in hours worked. The probability of detection, q, is assumed
to follow a Poisson process with constant arrival probability over any
period of a given length. As a consequence, q''CO.2
It is worth noting that under these assumptions, the no shirking
constraint can be inverted to give a maximum hours constraint
(3) h h*(P(b))
which says simply that for any pension level, there is a maimum number of
hours the worker can be employed without shirking. The no shirking
constraint and the maximum hours constraint are identical so that if the no
shirking constraint is binding so is the maximum hours constraint. The
maximum hours form of the no shirking constraint is useful for the
multiperiod model.
The firm maximizes profits, iv,
(4) ,rtv(h) -w
where v is the value of the worker's output. It is assumed that v'>O and
that v''￿O. The firm maximizes (4) subject to the no shirking constraint5
and the constraint that the expected value of the job to the worker must
reach the competitive level. Denote the monetized value of not working at
the firm (i.e. the value of leisure or of alternative employment) as s(h).
The firm must offer at least the competitive value of employment so that
(5) w -e(h)-s(h)-b+P(b)￿ 0
where s is the shadow value of time, which may be the value of leisure or
the value of alternative employment. The term P(b)-b, can be thought of as
the cost of the bond or pension. Presentation is somewhat simplified if
equation (5) is rewritten as
(6) w -e(h)-s(h)-c(P)
where c(P) is the cost of the pension.
A seemingly critical issue is whether the firm can steal the bond. If
the firm may, under certain circumstances choost to pocket the bond, then
profits will depend on the probability that the firm will steal the bond and
the size of the bond. In what follows, it is assumed that for a given size
of bond, the firm knows in advance whether it will be more profitable to
honor the commitment or simply steal the bond. If firms are heterogeneous
with respect to the level of the bond at which it becomes profitable for
them to steal rather than honor the commitment, workers will discount the
bond by the probability that it will be stolen. P(b) can be thought of as
the expected bond repayment. Thus this formulation is quite general. The
results are not fundamentally different although somewhat more complicated6
if the firms does not know in advance whether it will cheat and thus must
take account of the possible value of cheating.
Under these assumptions, the firm maximizes profits subject to the no
shirking constraint (2) and the minimum job value constraint (5).
Substituting the constraints into (4) yields
(7) —v(h)-e(h)
-s(h)-c[e(h)/q(h)]
Maximizing (7) with respect to hours gives the first order condition
(8) v' -e'-s' c'(e'/q -eq'/q2).
The restrictions on e'' and q'' are sufficient to ensure that the right hand
side of (8) is positive so that hours are chosen so that vmp exceeds the
marginal disutility of employment.3 Whether this departure from the
"standar& efficiency condition has any significance for policy depends on
whether in some way government can effect thet marginal cost of bonding. If
not, the contract is constrained efficient.
It will also be the case that workers will feel constrained to work
fewer hours than they desire. To see this note that the profit maximizing
firm will hire workers until the point that the wage equals vmp. Since
v' '<0, the hourly wage (w/h=v/h) is at least as great as v' and thus greater
than the marginal disutility of employment giver, by e'+s' .Asa result,
workers will desire more hours.
Hours constraints are binding in this model despite the fact that the
wage equals the value of marginal product. Thus, contrary to the model of7
first best efficient contracts developed by Lazear, divergence of VMP and
wages is not necessary for the existence ofhours constraints.
It is important to note that market clearing is essential to this
result. To see this, consider an efficiency wage model designed to parallel
the bonding model just developed. The firm offers a pension, P, conditional
on the worker not being caught shirking and maximizes profits subject to the
no shirking constraint (2). Since (5) is not binding, it sets w equal to




Maximizing (9) with respect to (h) gives the first order condition
(10) v' a (l+c)(e'/q -eq'/q2.)
There is no determinate relation between the right hand side of (10) and the
marginal disutility of employment. Consequently, in an efficiency wage
model, the choice of hours may be greater than or less than the first best
efficient level. Similarly, if workers view their hourly wage as P/h. it is
indeterminate whether workers will want to work more or less than determined
by the firm.
It is worth noting that this conclusion contrasts sharply with Bulow
and Summers (1986) who argue that in an efficiency wage model, firms will
prevent workers from being employed part-time. In essence, Bulow and
Summers assume that both e'' and q'' equal zero. If this assumption were
correct, the firm would set hours until either v' equalled zero or theB
worker's time endowment was exhausted. It seems likely that in either
event, the hours chosen would be quite high and that therefore s(h) would be
sufficiently high to make the labor market constraint binding. In effect,
it is probable that under the Bulow/Sununers assumption, firms would clear
the market by setting very high work hours. However, as noted above, q''—O
is not a natural assumption. Therefore, it appears that the efficiencywage
model does not make any strong predictions about the nature of hours
constraints.
II. The multi-Deriod model
When the model is extended to many periods, we require more structure
so that it is necessary to assume a particular reason for bonding being
costly. In this section I assume that the cost arises from workers having
higher discount rates than firms. Bonding will be costly because if the
worker is to be equally well off, an increase it the bond will require a
repayment to the worker which exceeds the initial value of the bond to the
firm. While the precise results may vary depending on the reasons for
bonding being costly, the essential result that costly bonding implies the
impossibility of first best contracts should be evident from the specific
model.
If firms' and workers' discount rates differ, the firm maximizes
profits which are given by
(11) profits t/(l)t -t/(l+r)tJ+ b -P/(l+r)T.9
As noted in the previous section, the no shirking constraint can be
inverted to give a maximum hours constraint in each period. The firm
maximizes (11) subject to the hours constraint for each period
(12) EAt[hth*t(E(wjej(hj)sj(hj))/(1+i)t +P/(l+i)Tt+1)
It should be noted that since the constraint requires that be less than
h*t, assuming A is nonpositive.
Maximization of (11) is also subject to the constraint that over the
lifetime the worker receives at least the competitive level of utility
(13) A0 f-b +E(wtet(ht)st(h))/(l+i)t1 +P/(l+i)T].
The first order conditions with respect to and w are given by




To prove that the hours constraint is always binding, combine the first
order conditions for w andw41 and rearrange terms to get
(16) —ri/[h*1(l+r)t1.10
Provided that i is greater than r so that bonding is costly, the hours
constraint will be binding.
To prove that hours will be set below their optimal level, we combine
(14) and (15) to obtain
(17) v -e'
-s'At(l+r)tl
Since is negative (see also equation (15), equation (16) implies that
hours are set at a level at which the marginal product of labor exceeds the
marginal disutility of employment (the disutility of labor plus the marginal
value of time) so that hours are sub-optimal.
The fact that hours are set according to the maximum hours constraint
does not necessarily imply that workers are constrained to work fewer hours
than they desire. If the wage were sufficiently lower than lIMP, workers
could be constrained to work more than they want even though the level of
hours was suboptimal. However, it will be shown in the next section that
over the period of the contract, discounted wages exceed VMP. It follows
that since, at least in some periods, the wage exceeds lIMP and VMP exceeds
the marginal disutility of employment, that workers will be constrained to
work fewer hours than they wish at least in some periods.
III. Mandatory Retirement
It is also possible to show using this multiperiod model that, if it
occurs, mandatory retirement will be set at an age when vmpexceedsthe
marginal disutility of employment. To do this it is helpful to begin by
solving for the hours and wage profiles.11
Hours of work each period can be obtained by eliminating At from




which is a function only of h and exogenous variables since by the inverse
function rule h*' is just (q/e)'.
Given h, it is possible to solve for the wage profile. Since the hours
constraint is binding, the no shirking constraint is also binding, and the
wage profile can be obtained by backwards induction as in Becker and Stigler
(1974) and Alcerlof and Katz (1986). In order to stop the worker from
shirking in the last period, the pension must be sufficiently large to
satisfy the no shirking condition
(19) P/(l+i) -e —(l-q)P/(l+i)
or
(20) F —(l+i)e/q.
In every period before the last, the no shirking condition can be solved to
give
(21) w—e+s+ie/q.
In the first period, the wage is indeterminate, but it is possible to solve12
for the wage minus the bond. The algebraic manipulations in the remainder
of this section are somewhat simplified if the first period wage is treated
as being determined by (21) and the bond is allowed to adjust to set w1-b
equal to its equilibrium value. Using constraint (13), it can be seen that
the bond will be given by
(22) b =(1+i)e/q
so that, in effect, workers receive interest on their bond as long as they
are working and have the principal returned when they retire. It should be
noted that in this model, whether actual upfront bonds are required or
whether a lower first period wage is sufficient to clear the market depends
on the value of w1-b and not just on the value of b. This point is
discussed in greater detail in Akerlof and Katz (1986).
To determine the mandatory retirement age, we need to consider the
effect of increasing the contract by an extra year. The change in profits
consists of two parts -- firmsgain or lose the difference between the value





Substituting from (20) for the pension and from (23) for the wage and
rearranging terms gives
(24) Aprofits =(l+r)T(v-e-s-ie/q +e/q(l
-1/(l+r)fl.13





or, in other words when the Value of marginal product exceeds the disutility
of employment. Thus just as hours are chosen sub-optimally in the bonding
model, the mandatory retirement age is chosen sub-optimally.
Moreover, "mandatory" retirement will have to be mandatory. From (23),
it is evident that mandatory retirement will only occur when the wage
exceeds VMP. Since the wage exceeds VMP and VMP exceeds the disutility of
employment, workers would prefer to maintain the employment relation.
A particularly interesting case arises when the e, s and v profiles and
thus h* are all independent of age or experience. From (18) it is obvious
that, in this case, hours will be set at the same level in each period and
that except for the first period, wages will be constant. Thus the wage
profile takes the form of an initial low wage or bond, a constant wage over
the rest of the employment relation and a pension at retirement. This is in
many ways the prototypical bonding model and has all the properties of
models in which the value of shirking/disutility of effort is assumed to be
exogenous and independent of hours worked.
It is straightforward to show that in this special case, firms need
never establish a mandatory retirement age. Firms are indifferent with
respect to the length of the contract. To see this note that firms will
employ workers up to the point that over the length of the contract the14
value of marginal product equals compensation or
(26) E(vw)/(l+r)t +b-P/(l+r)T—o.
Substituting for w, b and P gives the result that the profit maximization
condition (26) and the mandatory retirement condition (25) are identical in
this model. In other words, extending the contract by one year has no
effect on profits in this case, and the firm is indifferent with respect to
when the worker retires.
In general, however, the v, e, and s schedules will not be constant
over the worker's lifetime. Provided that the disutility of employment
rises faster than VMP, the firm will set a mandatory retirement age. As
noted above, this retirement age will not be socially optimal. The precise
relation between VMP, the wage and the mandatory retirement age depends on
the particular reasons for bonding being costly.
IV. Public Policy and Sources of Costly Bonding
Since hours are chosen to maximize profits subject to a constraint on
worker well-being, it is not possible to improve on the hours contract by
altering hours directly. Similarly, since bonds and pensions are chosen in
this manner, government cannot improve welfare by legislating the size of
bonds and pensions. However, it is possible that other government policies
may improve welfare. In essence, the inefficiency arises because bonds are
not sufficiently large. If the cost of bonding could be reduced or the size
of bonds increased costlessly by government, welfare would be increased.15
Whether such policies exist, depends on the reasons for bonding being
costly.
-
Thereappear to be three main reasons why bonding might be costly. The
first is differences in discount rates, as in sections II and III. The
second is possible malfeasance by the fin. The third is the possibility of
mistakes.
If bonding costs are due to differences in discount rates, government
could improve welfare by taxing older workers and subsidizing younger
workers. Since the transfers would not be contingent on performance, they
would be consistent with the no shirking constraint. Of course, the
worker/firm contract could duplicate the after-tax profile. Instead of
having workers post a bond which is not repaid if workers cheat, fins and
workers might agree that workers, would pay a fine if they were caught
shirking. While such contracts might not be legal,. firms could instead lend
the equivaleot of the bond to workers, say "for the purchase of a house,"
and require repayment regardless of whether the worker remained with the
firm. The fact that we do not observe such contracts very often may imply
that differences in discount rates are not the source of costly bonding or
that these alternative contractual arrangements are equally costly.
If differences in discount rates are important it may be possible to
use public policies to affect directly workers' discount rates. For
example, if profits are stochastic so that firms may go bankrupt and if
firms are risk neutral but workers are risk averse, the value to workers of
a one dollar increase in P is less than its cost to the firm so that
workers, in effect, have higher discount rates than fins and bonding is
costly. It is clear that in this situation some sort of ERISA like policy16
in which "pensions" are guaranteed can be welfare improving. It is less
obvious why the free market could not develop such insurance on its own.
Perhaps some combination of moral hazard and adverse selection would provide
an explanation.
Similarly, if workers are sometimes misconstrued as shirking, and
workers are risk averse, bonding will be costly.4 In this model, welfare
might be increased by some kind of grievance procedure or quasi-judicial
review which reduced the probability of a worker being fired. However,
again if such improvements were possible. It is difficult to see why they
would not be instituted in the agreement between the worker and firm.
The most plausible case for some sort of gcvernment intervention arises
if there is a possibility of firm malfeasance. If bonding is costly because
firms have an incentive to steal the bond, then government may be able to
increase welfare by inhibiting firms from malfeasance, in practice, this
entails interference with employment at will and may have negative side
effects since presumably government would make it more difficult not only to
fire workers without cause but also workers who have shirked. Again, it is
not impossible that the free market could develop institutions similar to
the governmental institutions, but government may have a significant
advantage in this area.
Similarly, the desirability of restricting mandatory retirement depends
critically on the source of costly bonding. In the model presented in
section II and III, simply delaying the mandatory retirement age is not
welfare improving. The cost of bonding exceeds the difference between older
workers' VMP and their reservation wage. Thus the results of this paper17
serve to underscore the significance of understanding the reasons that
bonding is costly.
The essential message of this paper has been presented using a variety
of different models. While the most extensive discussion concerned a model
in which workers and- firms have different discount rates, it should be clear
that the essential point does not depend on the precise formulation.
Provided that bonding is costly, it will make sense to use bonding as little
as possible so that the no shirking constraint will be binding.
The sub-optimality of the hours and the mandatory retirement age
imposed by the contract casts light on the bonding/efficiency wage debate.
A major issue between proponents of the two models has been whether the
agency problem imposed by shirking results in involuntary unemployment
(Carmichael, 1985; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, 1985). Carmichael maintains
that the involuntary unemployment which arises in shirking versions of the
efficiency wage model depends critically on the assumption that workers
cannot post bonds. He argues that even with capital market imperfections,
the level of bonds will adjust so that the marginal worker is just
indifferent between working and not working.
In the model presented in this paper, it seems reasonable to argue that
workers who cannot obtain a job because they have passed mandatory
retirement age are involuntarily unemployed although the issue may be more
one of semantics or ideology than of substance. They are voluntarily
unemployed in the sense that they are unwilling to work at the best offer
any employer is willing to make them. On the other hand. their reservation
wage is below their value of marginal product. The reason that they cannot
reach an agreement with a firm is, of course, ttat the wage they require18
plus the cost of bonding is less than their VMP.
In addition, the results suggest that whether or not the agency model
leads to involuntary unemployment, it definitely leads to involuntary
underemployment. Involuntary underemployment may be as significant an
economic phenomenon as involuntary unemployment. Kahn and Lang (1986)
estimate that 40 to 45% of hourly workers are involuntarily underemployed.
This paper suggests that the agency problem may provide an explanation for
the prevalence of such underemployment.19
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FOOTNOTES
1. For simplicity it is assumed that the worker either shirks for the entire
period or not at all. Formally, this assumption requires that e'' not be
too large.
2. Intuitively, while the probability of being caught in any particular hour
remains constant, the probability of having already been caught rises as
hours worked increases. Consequently, the marginal contribution of the last
hours worked to the probability of being caught decreases with hours worked.
3. To see this multiply by q and divide by e to get e'/e -q'/q.The first
term is at least as great as 1/h while the second term is strictly less than
1/h.
4. This argument is developed formally for the legal system in Polinsky and
Shavell (1979).